Now that B-H has gone up more than a hundredfold, it is at a premium to book value. Buffett himself reports doubts that he can find [for the growing total that he had to invest] opportunities comparable to those in the past. (p. 6) Buffett understands well the distinction between hindsight and foresight. Lowenstein, writing in his biography of Buffett about the events surrounding the increase in the DJIA beyond 1,000 in early 1966 and its subsequent decline by spring, noted that some of Buffett's partners called to warn him that the market might decline further. Such calls, said Buffett, raised two questions:
(1) If they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn't they let me in on it then; and (2) if they didn't know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? (p. 97) Not everyone distinguishes hindsight from foresight as well as Samuelson or Buffett. Most people fall into the pitfall of hindsight by exaggerating the quality of their foresight. Fischhoff (1975a Fischhoff ( , 1975b described hindsight bias as the belief that whatever happened was bound to happen, as if uncertainty and chance were banished from the world. So, if an introverted man marries a shy woman, it must be because (as we have known all along) "birds of a feather flock together" and if he marries an outgoing woman, it must be because (as we have known all along) "opposites attract." Similarly, if stock prices decline after a prolonged rise, it must be (as we have known all along) that "trees don't grow to the sky" and if stock prices continue to rise, it must be (as we have equally known all along) that "the trend is your friend."
Hindsight, Foresight, and Discounting
Some investors saw Buffett's happy investment results and recognized his great abilities many years ago. Loomis extolled his record in the pages of Fortune back in 1970:
Buffett's record has been extraordinarily good. In his thirteen years of operation (all of them, including 1969, profitable), he compounded his investors' money at a 24 percent annual rate. (p. 139) By 1983, Buffett was famous. Greenbaum (1983) wrote, "Warren Buffett, who has an almost legendary reputation as a successful investor . . . ." (p. 98). 
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Hindsight in Mutual Funds
The prices for shares of Berkshire Hathaway, like the prices of shares of closed-end funds, provide a record of their value-in-foresight. But we have no such record for mutual funds because they have no prices, only net asset values. To consider hindsight in the evaluation of the performance of any one mutual fund requires an analysis of the average performance of all mutual funds. Marcus (1990) demonstrated awareness of hindsight bias in evaluating the performance of Fidelity's Magellan Fund. Magellan outperformed the S&P 500 in 11 of the 13 years ending in 1989. The likelihood of a randomly selected fund producing such a performance record is less than 5 percent. But as Marcus noted, Magellan was not a randomly selected fund; it was a fund he chose because he knew, with hindsight, that it did well in the preceding 13 years. Combating hindsight bias requires that we go to the beginning of the 13-year period, not to its end.
So, imagine that we begin with 500 fund managers flipping a coin each year and winning their contest against the S&P 500 if the coin turned out heads. Marcus calculated that the probability of the best-performing fund manager beating the S&P 500 in 11 years or more is 99.8 percent. He went on to analyze the margin by which Magellan beat the S&P 500, however, and concluded that it is far beyond what one could have reasonably expected by chance alone in an efficient market, even accounting for the hindsight by which past winners are selected.
The logic underlying Marcus's analysis is the logic of Bayes. Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (BMW 1999) used the Oakmark Fund under the management of Robert Sanborn to illustrate the application of Bayesian analysis to performance measurement. Oakmark earned an alpha of 1.02 percentage points a month from September 1991, the start of Sanborn's tenure, through December 1996, the end of BMW's analysis period. The standard error of this alpha estimate is 0.24 percent, and the t-statistic of 4.27 implies that the likelihood that Oakmark's superior performance is a result of chance alone is only 3 out of 100,000. Nevertheless, the presence of hindsight bias in the selection of Oakmark requires that the positive alpha of Oakmark be tempered by the negative alpha of the average mutual fund. After BMW performed their analysis, they rendered a verdict in favor of Oakmark. More generally, BMW doubted "that zero investment in active managers can be justified on the basis of statistical evidence alone" (p. 30).
The more recent performance of the Magellan and Oakmark funds demonstrates the difference between hindsight and foresight. Magellan did not perform as well in recent years as it did in the early years. Although Magellan outperformed the S&P 500 in 11 of the 13 years ending in 1989, it beat the Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund, as Panel A of Figure  2 shows, in only 4 of the 11 years from 1990 through 2000. Panel B shows that the Oakmark fund that outperformed the S&P 500 from September 1991 through 1996 lagged the Vanguard S&P 500 fund in 1997, 1998, 1999 , and the first quarter of 2000.
As Oakmark's performance deteriorated, investors became impatient with Sanborn, as did Sanborn's bosses. He was gone by March 2000. Ironically, we know with hindsight that Sanborn's investment philosophy triumphed soon after he left. Oakmark did well in the second quarter of 2000 (see Panel B of Figure 2 ), did even better in the third quarter, and crowned its performance in the fourth quarter. Its outperformance of the Vanguard S&P 500 fund in these quarters was, respectively, more than 5 pps, more than 7 pps, and more than 20 pps.
The Buffett Factor
"Although a professed disciple of Benjamin Graham's fundamentalism, Buffett's edge comes from his genius, not his precepts," wrote Samuelson (1989, p. 6) . Buffett is a disciple of Graham when he buys bargain stocks, but he deviates from Graham's teaching when he buys nonbargain "franchise stocks," such as Coca Cola and Gillette. Indeed, a Seligman (1983) , discussing the excellent investment record of William Ruane's Sequoia Fund as well as the record of Warren Buffett, noted that both pursue the ideas of Benjamin Graham. Sequoia, which had 35.64 percent of its assets in Berkshire Hathaway shares as of December 31, 2000, has done well over the years, much better than the S&P 500, but not nearly as well as the stock of Berkshire Hathaway. The annualized return of Sequoia during the period from September 30, 1971, through year-end 2000, was 16.07 percent, higher than the 13.23 percent return of the S&P 500, but much lower than the 28.32 percent return of Berkshire Hathaway.
The Buffett factor is also evident when the performance of Berkshire Hathaway's stock is compared with the performance of other mutual funds that claim an affinity to the ideas of Graham and Buffett. Scott (1998) with the holdings of Berkshire Hathaway, although not as much as they did in earlier years. Bush (2000) identified Ed Walczak of the Vontobel U.S. Value Fund as one who modeled his investment strategy on Buffett's and started building a position in Berkshire Hathaway stock. Herbert (2000) How have these emulators done? The performance of the Weitz and Vontobel funds, like that of Sequoia, was better than the performance of the S&P 500, but it was not nearly as good as the performance of Berkshire Hathaway shares. Table  3 shows, for example, that although the 16.95 percent annualized return of Weitz in the 1987-2000 period was higher than the 15.83 percent return of the S&P 500 in that period, Weitz lagged by a wide margin the 25.91 percent return of Berkshire Hathaway shares. Legg Mason lagged both the S&P 500 and Berkshire Hathaway shares in one of the few periods in which even Berkshire Hathaway lagged the S&P 500 (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) .
Managing Foresight
One part of the Buffett factor involves the extraordinary performance of Berkshire Hathaway's shares, and the other part involves the almost equal distribution of that performance over time-as if Buffett distributes information about his genius in measured quantities so that his genius is obvious only in hindsight. Table 4 shows that Berkshire Hathaway outperformed the S&P 500 in almost all five-year periods.
To understand the importance of the flow of information on the assessment of performance, imagine that investors assessed perfectly the investment abilities of Buffett on the day he took over Berkshire Hathaway. If so, the price of a share of Berkshire Hathaway on May 10, 1965, would have jumped spectacularly-from $18 to $1,383-and the headlines in the following day's papers would have screamed the news. But little would have been written about Buffett's investment record ever since; Berkshire Hathaway's performance from May 11, 1965, through the end of December 2000, would have matched that of the S&P 500. What would there be to write about?
Companies have learned recently to manage investor expectations by leading analysts to believe that EPS will be 13 cents and surprising them with 14 cents, but Buffett has been a master at managing expectations for many years. He dampens expectations through his behavior and his words. For example, as for unassuming behavior, Updegrave (1987) wrote about Buffett:
With his earnest horn-rimmed glasses and wisps of thinning hair, Warren Buffett, 57, looks as much like a small-time Nebraska feed salesman as one of our pre-eminent investors. (p. 36) As for unassuming words, Tobias (1983) The bias of hindsight that leads us to believe that we have seen Berkshire Hathaway's extraordinary performance with foresight also fools us into believing that we can identify the next Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway. We might identify, instead, the next WebVan, the next Enron, or any of the many stocks that peaked at tens, or even hundreds, of dollars before they were gone. Today more than ever, through 401(k) and other saving programs, investors hold their financial futures in their own hands. They cannot entirely avoid the risks in investing, but they cannot afford to let the confidence of hindsight ruin their financial well-being.
We thank Richard Bernstein, David Braverman, Sanjiv Das, Ramie Fernandez, Martin Fridson, Russ Kinnel, Lloyd Kurtz, Paul Samuelson, Howard Silverblatt, Andrew Teufel, Premal Vora, Steven Wade, Avi Wohl, and Jason Zweig. Meir percent annualized), whereas the monthly standard deviation for the S&P 500 was only 4.29 percent (14.88 percent annualized). On the other hand, the beta of Berkshire Hathaway shares relative to the S&P 500 is 0.85, so a portfolio that combines a small proportion of Berkshire Hathaway shares with a large proportion of the S&P 500 is less risky than a portfolio that consists exclusively of the S&P 500. 3. The ranking of the more than 21,000 stocks does not provide an "apples-to-apples" comparison of their performance. For example, some stocks on the CRSP list belong to companies that died before Berkshire Hathaway was born; others were born only recently. Still, Berkshire Hathaway is likely to be in the top group of performers by any reasonable benchmark.
